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KRISTELLER AND ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY
JAMES HANKINS
Paul Oskar kristeller’s first scholarly interests and his first publications 
focused on the history of ancient philosophy, and his early studies were 
undertaken with a view to becoming a university professor specializing in 
the history of ancient philosophy. even though his scholarly life later led 
him to the study of renaissance philosophy and humanism, he maintained 
a professional interest in ancient philosophy throughout his life. When he 
first found employment in the united states, it was as a teacher of ancient 
philosophy, and a survey of Hellenistic philosophy was among his regular 
course offerings during the three decades of his teaching career at Columbia. 
these lectures were eventually published in italian in 1991 and english in 
1993; they were kristeller’s last substantial publication as an historian of 
philosophy.
1 Moreover, kristeller’s sophisticated understanding of ancient 
philosophy in all its phases and his familiarity with the relevant primary texts 
in the original languages gave him unique advantages in his major studies of 
renaissance philosophy and humanism. the impact of kristeller’s studies of 
ancient philosophy upon his studies of the renaissance is a point to which 
i shall return at the end of this essay.
kristeller’s first teacher of ancient philosophy was ernst Hoffmann, with 
whom he began to study informally during his last years at the Mommsen-
Gymnasium in Berlin.
2 Hoffman had received his doctorate in 1905 from 
Berlin, where he was a student of Hermann Diels, editor of the still-standard 
collection of Presocratic fragments, and theodor Vahlen, the historian of 
ancient mathematics. a noted expert on Plato, Hoffmann was primarily 
1.  Filosofi greci dell’età ellenistica (Pisa: scuola Normale superiore, 1991); Greek 
philosophers of the Hellenistic Age (New York: Columbia university Press, 1993).
2.  On Hoffman, see the obituary notice by anna Forbes liddell in The Journal 
of Philosophy 49 (1952): 505-6. it is worth noting that Hoffmann’s title was in fact 
“Ordinarius für Philosophie und Pädagogik,” and that among his publications is a 
posthumously published work on Pädagogischer Humanismus (Zurich: artemis Verlag, 
1955), which gives an historical account of Humanismus and Western educational 
thought from the Presocratics to nineteenth-century Germany.132
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known for his rather dogmatic insistence that Plato’s philosophy was a 
theistic doctrine which could be assimilated to the systems of Plotinus and 
kant. in the later 1920s, under the influence of his colleague and friend 
ernst Cassirer,
3 Hoffmann’s interests began to spread outwards from classical 
philosophy to renaissance Platonism, a move that would be emulated by 
kristeller a few years later. in the mid-1920s kristeller followed Hoffmann 
to Heidelberg when the latter received an appointment there in 1922 and 
kristeller continued as Hoffmann’s student and protégé until 1929. Hoffmann 
was still in his forties and just becoming established when kristeller began 
studying with him. 
at that point in his career Hoffman was a Neo-kantian with strong links 
to the Marburg school, having studied himself with Paul Natorp and ernst 
Cassirer. Marburgian Neo-kantianism saw the history of philosophy not as 
an antiquarian study or as a branch of Altertumswissenschaft, but as a valid 
form of philosophical activity in itself. in particular, Neo-kantian history of 
philosophy fought against the historicism of Hegel and his school, attempting 
to show that pre-modern Western thought was not vitiated by its supposedly 
more limited consciousness of human autonomy and freedom. instead, 
Neo-kantians held that premodern Western philosophy, like contemporary 
philosophy, was, as it were, fully adult, and contained ideas and arguments 
that remained universally valid for all time. ancient philosophy was 
studied as a treasury of positions and arguments that could be utilized by 
modern philosophers, who could study it unembarrassed by the scruples 
of historicism (or, as we might now say, of linguistic contextualism). Neo-
kantian historians of philosophy were especially interested in Plato and the 
Platonic tradition because they saw in the Platonic theory of ideas and late 
Platonic logic an anticipation of kantian apriori judgments and regulative 
ideas. the commonality between Plato and kant was not merely a matter of 
historical interest for Neo-kantians; Platonic authority also helped establish 
the universal truth of kantianism by showing the presence of kant’s leading 
ideas in the thought of the greatest Western philosophers. For Neo-kantians 
of the Marburg school, Platonism was a philosophia perennis.
4
as a leading representative of this tradition, it is no surprise that Hoffmann 
put the young kristeller on to the study of Plotinus. Hoffmann and Heinrich 
rickert, kristeller’s other great Neo-kantian teacher, edited a series, the 
3.  the two wrote a textbook together: ernst Cassirer and ernst Hoffmann, Die 
Geschichte der antiken Philosophie (Berlin: [ullstein], 1925). Cusanus played a central 
role in all of Cassirer’s historical writing about the renaissance.
4.  On Neo-kantianism in general see klaus Christian köhnke, The Rise of Neo-
Kantianism: German Academic Philosophy between Idealism and Positivism (Cambridge: 
Cambridge university Press, 1991).133
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Heidelberger Abhandlungen zur Philosophie und ihrer Geschichte, which published 
studies of kantian philosophy, polemics against phenomenology, and studies 
of ancient philosophy, particularly Platonic philosophy. Most of the volumes 
in the series were by students of rickert and Hoffman, including a volume by 
ernst Cassirer’s son Heinrich, who later emigrated to the united states and 
became a Protestant theologian and kantian scholar. it was in this series in 
1929 that kristeller published his first book, Der Begriff der Seele in der Ethik 
des Plotin,
5 a study somewhat altered from the thesis of the same title finished 
under Hoffmann at Heidelberg during the summer of 1928.
the project of Der Begriff der Seele was to show the organic interrelationship 
between two sides of Plotinus’ thought that had previously been treated as 
distinct and almost unrelated aspects of his system, namely his metaphysics 
and what Plotinus scholars at the time considered his “religious mysticism” 
or “vie spirituelle”.
6 kristeller showed that the “inner experience” of the soul, 
its contemplative ascent to the One, not only was an avenue to awareness of 
higher realities, but in effect constituted them; that the activity of soul and 
mind is the higher reality upon which physical realities depend. Consequently, 
the three Hypostases of Mind, soul and Body can be considered either 
statically, as objectively existing realities, or dynamically, from the point of 
view of “inner experience”. the terms kristeller used to describe these two 
tendencies, gegenständlich, corresponding to the metaphysical analysis of 
reality, and aktuell, corresponding to the “turning within” of the soul, were 
later picked up by the great Plotinus scholar Hans rudolf schwyzer, and 
have become standard terms in German Plotinus scholarship.
7 readers of 
the German edition of The Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino
8 will also recognize 
these terms, as well as the concept of “inner experience,” which kristeller 
later used to analyze Ficino’s thought.
kristeller’s distinction between the gegenständlich and the aktuell turned out 
to be the most significant contribution of his book to the interpretation of 
Plotinus, but in the study itself, the analysis of the soul’s relation to reality 
was meant to illustrate certain themes in Plotinian ethics. in particular, the 
5.  Heidelberger Abhandlungen zur Philosophie und ihrer Geschichte 19 (tübingen: J.C.B. 
Mohr, 1929).
6.  the most influential books on Plotinus of the 1920s were W.r. inge, The Philosophy 
of Plotinus: The Gifford Lectures at St. Andrews, 1917-1918 (New York: longmans, Green, 
1918; repr. 1923, 1929, 1948); Émile Bréhier, La philosophie de Plotin (Paris: Boivin, 
1928); rené arnou, Le désir de Dieu dans la philosophie de Plotin (Paris: alcan, 1921).
7.  “Die Zweifache sicht in der Philosophie Plotins,” Museum Helveticum 1 (1944): 
87–99.
8.  Die Philosophie des Marsilio Ficino (Frankfurt a. M.: klostermann, 1972).134
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conclusion to which the thesis builds is a demonstration of the kinship between 
Plotinian psychological experience and kant’s doctrine of freedom. 
according to kant [writes kristeller], the Will is free or unfree to the extent that 
its choices are made rationally and ethically. this corresponds to the hekousion 
and akousion of Plotinus. Moreover, according to kant the Will is capable of 
choosing for itself Freedom or unfreedom through an intelligible act. this is 
identical in meaning to the ethical Prohairesis of Plotinus. it is a paradoxical 
situation: [the fact that] consciousness has the liberty to be free or unfree holds 
the same meaning for both thinkers. it is here less a case of a demonstrable 
influence of Plotinus on kant than a similarity in basic philosophical concepts, 
which leads to similar intellectual consequences. [pp. 88-89]
For kristeller, kant’s idea that human beings achieve autonomy through 
freely willing the good, conceived as a dictate of apriori reason and therefore 
universal and disinterested, is identical to the Plotinian doctrine that sees 
freedom as residing in the consciousness that the human soul is constitutive 
of the rational order in the intelligible cosmos. a subtext or consequence of 
this reading is that Plotinus is liberated from interpreters who saw him as 
subservient to static norms and therefore an obstacle to the emergence of 
immanentism — or, on the other hand, as simply a religious mystic using 
the language of Platonism to describe an experience of God.
kristeller’s book also contains at the end a few pages on the influence of 
Plotinus on the later tradition of Western philosophy, pages which turned 
out to be prophetic of kristeller’s later career. Following Hoffmann’s essay, 
“Platonismus in Mittelalter,” published a few years before in the Vorträge der 
Bibliothek Warburg,
9 kristeller claimed that “the history of Platonism from 
Plotinus to the renaissance and beyond is essentially a history of Plotinismus” 
(106). it is in these pages that kristeller first mentions the name of Marsilio 
Ficino as the most important figure in the fifteenth-century renaissance of 
Plotinismus: “above all one must mention Marsilio Ficino, who translated and 
commented on the complete works of Plotinus and thus laid the basis for 
his later spiritual influence as well as for learned studies of him.” kristeller 
admitted that Plotinus’ influence on early modern philosophy had been less 
prominent but held out the possibility that “even here it is likely that his 
influence was greater than has hitherto been expected.”
the path to the study of Ficino would seem to have lain straight ahead. 
Hoffmann’s study of medieval Platonism and Cassirer’s Individuum und 
Kosmos, published shortly afterwards in 1927, also by the Bibliothek Warburg, 
indicated the direction in which the historical research of the Neo-kantians 
9.  (1923-1924): 17–82.135
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was moving as it tried to establish the continuity of the Platonic tradition in 
the West. But kristeller’s career ended up following a different route. after 
publishing his thesis in the Heidelberger Abhandlungen, Hoffmann turned 
around and rejected kristeller as an Habilitand on the grounds that he had a 
prior commitment to another Jewish student, and could not possibly support 
two Jewish candidates at the same time. the student to whom Hoffmann 
had a prior commitment was raymond klibansky, who had made the 
electrifying discovery of a previously unknown fragment of Proclus preserved 
in a medieval translation of Proclus’ commentary on the Parmenides.
10 it was 
klibansky who followed Hoffmann’s lead into the study of Nicolaus Cusanus 
and became his chief collaborator in editing the Heidelberg academy edition 
of Cusanus’ works (founded in 1927). But kristeller did not give up his hope 
of teaching philosophy at the university level and in 1931 was finally accepted 
as a Habilitand by Martin Heidegger, who was then at Freiburg.
kristeller had known Heidegger since 1926 when he had spent a semester 
in Marburg, where Heidegger then taught. kristeller later remembered, though 
with some uncertainty, that he had heard Heidegger lecture on aristotle, but 
Heidegger’s modern biographers identify the lectures he gave that semester as 
a part of a course on the pre-socratic philosophers.
11 since the chief sources 
for the thought of the pre-socratics are the works of aristotle, the confusion 
is understandable. kristeller developed a warm personal relationship with 
Heidegger, having dinner with him once a week and entertaining his family 
on the piano. (kristeller had earlier formed a piano trio with two other 
Heidegger students, karl löwith and Hans Georg Gadamer.) though some of 
Heidegger’s biographers believe the great philosopher was secretly attached 
to the Nazi cause as early as 1929,
12 kristeller seems to have been oblivious 
to Heidegger’s politics until the summer of 1933, when the latter emerged as 
the leading representative of the Nazi party on the faculty at Freiburg.
even in 1931, to study with Heidegger might appear to be something of a 
reversal of kristeller’s previous philosophical loyalties. Neo-kantianism in the 
10.  raymond klibansky, Ein Proklus-Fund und seine Bedeutung. Sitzungsberichte der 
Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophische-Historische Klasse, Bericht 5 
(Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1929).
11.  see Hans-Martin saas, Martin Heidegger: Bibliography and Glossary (Bowling Green, 
OH: Philosophy Documentation Center, Bowling Green state university, 1982), 82; 
some of Heidegger’s work on the Presocratics may be found in his Early Greek Think-
ing, trans. David Farrell krell and Frank a. Capuzzi (New York: Harper & row, 1975). 
kristeller’s memories of his course with Heidegger are recorded in Margaret king, “iter 
kristellerianum: the european Journey (1905–1939),” Renaissance Quarterly 47.4 
(1994): 907–29 at 914.
12.  see Hugo Ott, Martin Heidegger, trans. allan Blunden (New York: Basic Books, 
1993).136
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1920s was the official philosophy of the academic establishment. Challenges 
had been mounted to its dominant position, first by Dilthey and his epigones 
in the movement for Geistesgeschichte — a movement kristeller rejected under 
the influence of rickert. Other challenges were mounted by phenomenology, 
led by edmond Husserl, and by existentialism, inspired by kierkegaard and 
transplanted to Weimar Germany by karl Jaspars. kristeller had little use for 
Husserl and not much respect for Jaspers, at least as a scholar, but the case 
of Heidegger was different. Heidegger had a wide and enthusiastic following 
among philosophy students in the later 1920s, especially after his “defeat” 
of Cassirer in their famous debate at Davos in 1929.
13 the letters of Hannah 
arendt and other sources give a vivid impression of the excitement caused by his 
challenge to neo-kantianism and the idealistic tradition in general.
14 it would be 
tempting, and perhaps not wholly implausible, to posit a “Heideggerian” stage 
in kristeller’s intellectual development, following his rejection by Hoffmann. 
However, aside from some existential buzzwords in the Plotinus thesis, there 
is not much support in the the sources for such an hypothesis. kristeller tells 
us that he valued Heidegger as an interpreter of ancient philosophy, but there 
is no evidence that he ever deviated from his Platonizing Neo-kantianism in 
later life. He respected Heidegger’s greatness as a philosopher and was proud 
to have been his student but did not agree with him.
the more interesting question is whether Heidegger’s hermeneutical 
method in some way influenced kristeller, but here too any conclusions 
must be speculative. He certainly shared with Heidegger an interest in the 
history of philosophical terms and their transformations over time, and may 
have picked up from him the idea that the augustinian/scholastic concept of 
existentia (the act of existing as opposed to esse, the fact of existence) had its 
roots in the stoic notion of huparxis and not in aristotle, as was claimed by 
neo-scholastics such as Gilson.
15 But the history of philosophical terms was 
an interest of Hoffmann’s as well and it is certainly hard to identify anything 
peculiarly Heideggerian in kristeller’s method of textual analysis.
after completing his book on Plotinus, but before sitting for the Prussian 
state Board examinations in Berlin, kristeller wrote (in latin) a substantial 
paper on Cicero’s understanding of the most important philosophical term 
in the Platonic tradition, namely the term eidos or form (and idea, a virtual 
synonym). in this paper he tried to trace the evolution of the concept through 
13.  see Peter eli Gordon, “Continental Divide: ernst Cassirer and Martin Heidegger 
at Davos, 1929: an allegory of intellectual History,” Modern Intellectual History 1.2 
(2004): 219–48.
14.  Hannah arendt and Martin Heidegger, Letters, 1925-1975, ed. ursula ludz, trans. 
andrew shields (Orlando, Fl: Harcourt, 2004).
15.  kristeller, Greek Philosophers, 25–27 and note.137
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Hellenistic philosophy down to Plotinus, making use in particular of the 
neglected evidence of Cicero’s Orator. the paper was published in expanded 
form sixty years later by the university of Heidelberg on the occasion of 
the sixtieth anniversary of kristeller’s doctorate.
16 Had it been published in 
1929, it would have been an important early contribution to the literature on 
“intradeical” ideas in Middle Platonism, a theme later investigated by several 
students of later Greek philosophy after the second World War.
17
kristeller also incorporated the research he did for this paper and for a 
long review of Willy theiler’s Die Vorbereitung des Neuplatonismus (1930) 
into his other book-length contribution to ancient philosophy, Filosofi greci 
dell’età ellenistica (1991), published in english in 1993 as Greek Philosophers 
of the Hellenistic Age.
18 this book was based on lectures given at the scuola 
Normale in Pisa in 1989, which were in turn based on the survey course on 
Hellenistic philosophy kristeller taught many times at Columbia. the format 
of the book was meant to imitate the form kristeller used in his better-known 
work, Eight Philosophers of the Italian Renaissance (1964). 
By the time Greek Philosophers was shaped into book form, kristeller had not 
taught Hellenistic philosophy for twenty years and had not published in the 
field for nearly sixty. so it was not to be expected that the lectures would break 
new ground. its value lies rather in its synoptic sense of the place of Hellenistic 
philosophy in the Western tradition as a whole. it is hard to think of many 
students of ancient philosophy who could so casually introduce the subject the 
influence of Hellenistic philosophical concepts on the philosophies of Ficino, 
Bruno, Gassendi, leibniz and spinoza. the book is also valuable as an illustration 
of a sound philological method in the reconstruction of philosophical doctrines. 
it contains as well many obiter dicta, some amusing, some bitter, on the state of 
the philosophical enterprise and Western civilization as a whole. the book shows 
kristeller’s continuing belief in the ability of ancient philosophy to solve ethical 
problems in the modern world, as the passages on natural law, for example, show 
(pp. 38, 78). kristeller is particularly concerned to establish, on the evidence of 
16.  the original paper, “De formarum sive idearum apud Ciceronem notione,” writ-
ten as a thesis for a philosophy seminar in Berlin, is preserved in the kristeller Papers 
deposited in the rare Book and Manuscript library of Columbia university; the paper 
was eventually published under the title Die Ideen als Gedanken der menschlichen und 
göttlichhen Vernunft. Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, 
Philosophische-historische Klasse, no. 2 (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1989).
17.  see a.H. armstrong, “the Background of the Doctrine ‘that the intelligibles are 
not Outside the intellect’,” in Les Sources de Plotin: Entretiens Hardt 5 (Geneva, 1960), 
393–425.
18.  see note 1. kristeller’s review of theiler was published in the Deutsche Literaturzei-
tung 3.3 (1932): 438–45; see also his Greek Philosophers, 150–51.138
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stoic doctrine, that a belief in natural law is compatible with empiricism and 
materialism and is not dependent on religious imperatives or on “those kantian 
ideal and apriori principles that are valid for me but denied by the majority of 
our contempories.” Materialism need not imply ethical nihilism, in other words. 
Hence kristeller’s efforts, directed against leo strauss and others, to distinguish 
stoic natural law theory from the aristotelian concept of nomos.
in conclusion, it is worth raising the issue of the effect kristeller’s training and 
early studies in ancient philosophy had on his work as a renaissance scholar. 
apart from method, it is evident that his mastery of ancient and especially 
late ancient philosophy was a crucial element in his studies of humanism 
and renaissance thought. kristeller’s chief contribution as an interpreter of 
the renaissance, in my view, is his determined historicizing of humanism and 
renaissance philosophy, his resistence to the powerful anachronistic tendency 
in most prewar and much postwar historiography to assimilate the thought of 
the italian renaissance to modern humanisms and modern philosophies.
19 
One key to kristeller’s ability to distinguish renaissance humanism and 
philosophy from the moderns was his awareness of the ancient roots of much 
renaissance philosophical reflection. it was difficult, for example, to maintain 
that Pico was really a sartrian existentialist, as some interpreters maintained 
in the 1950s, once the most “existentialist” statements in his Oration had 
been identified as near-quotations from Boethius and the Cappadocian 
Fathers. it is hard to say that humanist statements about the radical freedom 
of mankind are “intellectual breakthroughs” looking forward to Hegel when 
it can be demonstrated that they come directly out of Plotinus or the stoics. 
the current tendency to historicize the renaissance may, perhaps, go too 
far, and in my opinion has gone too far, but kristeller’s example shows that 
any attempts to demonstrate the modernity of renaissance thought must 
begin from a solid mastery of the texts of the ancient philosophers in their 
original language.
n n n
19.  see my articles, “two twentieth-Century interpreters of renaissance Humanism: 
eugenio Garin and Paul Oskar kristeller,” Comparative Criticism 23 (2001): 3–19; 
and “renaissance Philosophy Between God and the Devil,” in The Renaissance in the 
Twentieth Century: Acts of an International Conference, Florence, Villa I Tatti, June 9-11, 
1999, ed. allen J. Grieco, Michael rocke, Fiorella Gioffredi superbi, Villa I Tatti Stud-
ies 19 (Florence: l.s. Olschki, 2002), 269–93. Both were reprinted in my Humanism 
and Platonism in the Italian Renaissance, 2 vols. (rome: edizioni di storia e letteratura, 
2003-2004), 1:573–90 and 591–15 respectively.